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Abstract
ACTAS is an integrated system for manipulating associative and commutative tree automata (AC-
tree automata for short), that has various functions such as for Boolean operations of AC-tree
automata, computing rewrite descendants, and solving emptiness and membership problems. In
order to deal with high-complexity problems in reasonable time, over- and under-approximation
algorithms are also equipped. Such functionality enables us automated veriﬁcation of safety prop-
erty in inﬁnite state models, that is helpful in the domain of, e.g. network security, in particular,
for security problems of cryptographic protocols allowing an equational property. In runtime of
model construction, a tool support for analysis of state space expansion is provided. The interme-
diate status of the computation is displayed in numerical data table, and also the line graphs are
generated. Besides, a graphical user interface of the system provides us a user-friendly environment
for handy use.
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1 Introduction
Tree automata are the counterpart of ﬁnite automata for strings, in the
sense that they inherit most of the properties holding for ﬁnite automata.
It is known that tree languages recognized by tree automata are closed un-
der Boolean operations and most of the decidability results are positive [4].
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The tree automata framework is useful in dealing with trees (i.e. terms), and
several veriﬁcation techniques based on the tree automata theory have been
studied [5,7]. For instance, Kaji et al. pointed out in [8] that several impor-
tant cryptographic protocols can be modeled by term rewriting systems (TRS
for short, [2]) and tree automata, and moreover, the positive decidability re-
sults and closure properties of tree automata allow us to design an automated
deduction technique for reasoning about the security problems.
In fact, veriﬁcation tools for security protocols have been developed by
using tree automata framework [1,3]. Genet and Viet Triem Tong provided
a tree automata library, called Timbuk [5,6], in which associative and com-
mutative properties of functions symbols are treated by using approximation.
Rule-based approaches allowing associativity and commutativity have been
also investigated, e.g. in [9].
Let us brieﬂy explain below how to handle the model checking problem
for inﬁnite state transition systems in practice by using term rewriting and
tree automata. We suppose that a TRS R over the signature F speciﬁes the
transition relation of a transition system M. We say M admits the transition
step s →M t under an initial state space L if (1) s = C[lσ] and t = C[rσ] for
some rewrite rule l → r in R, context C and substitution σ, and (2) there is
a state s0 in L such that s0 →∗M s, where →∗M is the reﬂexive and transitive
closure of →M. One should notice that →M ⊆ →R. Namely, the domain of
the system M is the set of all ground terms over F , and the state space of M
to be veriﬁed is the reachable states from L by R. We suppose that the initial
state space L can be represented by some tree automaton A, in such a way
that t ∈ L if and only if t is accepted by A. So, in this setting, given a rewrite
system and a tree automaton specifying each ofM and L, the reachable state
space of a transition system is considered to be deﬁned. In the paper, we
denote by L(A) the set of elements accepted by a tree automata A, and by
[→∗R ](L(A)) the set of reachable states.
Let P be some subset of the domain of M, that consists of states to which
we do not allow M to admit the transition step from any initial state in L.
For instance in the network protocols, P is the set of private information,
L is the initial knowledge of the intruder, and R is the intruder’s possible
operations. So the information obtainable by the intruder can be represented
by [→∗R ](L), and thus, the intersection of P and [→∗R ](L) contains a private
information that is reachable somehow by the intruder. In other words, the
non-emptiness of the intersection indicates that the protocol is not secure.
However, the set [→∗R ](L) of reachable states is not a regular tree language
even if L is a regular tree language. Even worse, it is not computable in general.
A tree language L is called regular if there exists a tree automata A such that
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L is recognized by A. To overcome the above problem there have been several
studies, such as: (1) to ﬁnd a subclass, i.e. suﬃcient conditions, of R in which
regularity is preserved, and (2) to extend the tree automata framework so that
a wider class of tree languages can be handled. Decidable subclasses of such
TRS that eﬀectively preserve regularity have been investigated in [16,17].
Regarding the second approach, it is known that regularity is not AC-
closed. Precisely, the AC-closure of a regular tree language is no longer regular.
A binary function symbol f in a signature F is associative and commutative
if the following axioms are assumed:
f(x, f(y, z)) = f(f(x, y), z) f(x, y) = f(y, x)
The AC-closure of a tree language L is, given a subset FAC of the binary
function symbols in F , a set {t | ∃s ∈ L. s =AC t}. Here =AC denotes the
equivalence relation induced by AC-axioms of all function symbols inFAC. The
above negative observation reveals that for modeling a cryptographic protocol
allowing equational property like Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange protocol, the
reachable state space can not be handled by the standard tree automata.
In this research we take the second approach. We proposed in [14] an
extension of tree automata, called equational tree automata. We also showed
in [11,12] that under certain useful equational axioms, e.g. associativity and/or
commutativity, tree languages accepted by the equational tree automata are
closed under Boolean operations. To this extent, the previous Diﬃe-Hellman
key exchange protocol can be handled, and even the veriﬁcation process is
automatable [13].
The AC-tree automata simulator (ACTAS) is a tool for the computation
of tree automata allowing that some of the binary function symbols are asso-
ciative and commutative. A screen shot of this system is presented in Fig. 1.
The class of AC-tree automata is eﬀectively closed under union and in-
tersection, and the membership and emptiness problems are decidable. In
regular case, the emptiness test is solvable in linear time. The decidability
result of emptiness problem for non-regular case is also positive, however, it is
not manageable in the sense of real computation, that can be observed by the
fact that the reachability of a Petri-net instance is known to be EXPSPACE-
hard and non-regular AC-tree automata are in some sense a generalization of
Petri-nets. Therefore we designed in ACTAS over- and under-approximation
algorithms, for eﬃciently computing rewrite descendants [→∗R/AC ](L(A/AC))
of given AC-tree automaton A/AC and AC-TRS R/AC.
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Fig. 1. Control panel of ACTAS
2 AC-Tree Automata
We begin this section by introducing AC-tree automata. We then explain how
to operate ACTAS as a tool for manipulating AC-tree automata and even as
a tool for supporting automated veriﬁcation.
A tree automaton (TA for short) A is a 4-tuple (F ,Q,Qﬁn ,∆), whose
components are the signature F , i.e. a ﬁnite set of function symbols with
ﬁxed arities, a ﬁnite set Q of special constant symbols, called states, with
F ∩ Q = ∅, a subset Qﬁn of Q whose elements are called ﬁnal states, and a
ﬁnite set ∆ of transition rules in one of the following forms:
f(p1, . . . , pn) → q1 (Type 1)
f(p1, . . . , pn) → f(q1, . . . , qn) (Type 2)
p1 → q1 (Type 3)
such that f ∈ F with arity(f) = n and p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn ∈ Q. In Type 2
the root function symbols of the left- and right-hand sides must be the same.
Transition rules in Type 3 are called -rules (“epsilon-rules”). A TAA is called
regular if ∆ consists only of rules in Type 1. Rules of Type 2 are not treated
in [4]. Under consideration of equational properties, however, Type 2 is essen-
tial in the sense that, e.g. recognizable tree languages of our deﬁnition have
a bijective correspondence to the word language hierarchy [11]. An eﬃcient
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algorithm for the intersection of such AC-tree automata, presented in [14], is
also one of the advantages.
A transition move →A is the rewrite relation →∆ by taking ∆ as a TRS
∆ over the signature F ∪ Q. A ground term t over F is accepted if t →∗A qf
for some qf ∈ Qﬁn . The set of terms accepted by a tree automaton A is
denoted as L(A). A tree language L, that is a subset of all ground terms, is
recognizable if there is a tree automata A such that L = L(A).
An equational tree automaton is a pair of a tree automaton A and an
equational theory E , denoted as A/E . The transition move is deﬁned by
the relation →A modulo E . An AC-tree automaton is an equational tree
automaton whose equational theory is the associativity and commutativity
axioms for some of the binary function symbols in F . The basic properties of
AC-tree automata are stated below:
Theorem 2.1 [12,14] (1) The class of tree languages recognizable with AC-
tree automata are closed under union and intersection. (2) The class of tree
languages recognizable with regular AC-tree automata are closed under Boolean
operations. (3) The membership problem and the emptiness problem for AC-
tree automata are decidable. 
We consider the tree automaton A with the following transition rules
a → qa b → qb f(qa, qb) → q f(q, q)→ q
with the ﬁnal state q. Suppose f is associative and commutative, then the
AC-tree automaton A/AC accepts such trees t that
|t|a = |t|b
i.e. the number of occurrences of a is the same as the number of occurrences
of b in the same tree t. One should notice that the above language is not
recognizable with any tree automata.









The signature of the term model is speciﬁed by declaring AC-symbols (e.g.
AC: f) and also declaring constant function symbols (e.g. const: a,b). Ac-
cording to the syntax, the other constant symbols are recognized as state
symbols. The tree automaton A is speciﬁed in the second module, named A,






6: 0 -> s(s(0))
7: [T-rule(q): A1]
8: 0 -> q_0
9: q_0 -> q
10: s(q_0) -> q_1
11: sum(q_1,q_1) -> q
12: sum(q,q) -> q
13: [T-rule(q): A2]
14: 0 -> q
15: s(q) -> q_1
16: s(q_1) -> q
17: sum(q_1,q_1) -> q
18: sum(q,q) -> q
Fig. 2. AC-rewrite descendant computation in ACTAS
by listing the transition rules. The argument value q of T-rule is the ﬁnal
state of the tree automaton A.
At the current implementation, ACTAS is equipped with the following func-
tions for (i)–(ii) Boolean operations and (iii) rewrite descendants computation,
and the two solvers for (iv) membership problem and (v) emptiness problem:
(i) Given AC-tree automata A/AC and B/AC, construct an AC-tree automa-
ton C/AC such that L(C/AC) = L(A/AC) ∪ L(B/AC).
(ii) Given AC-tree automata A/AC and B/AC, construct an AC-tree automa-
ton C/AC such that L(C/AC) = L(A/AC) ∩ L(B/AC).
(iii) Given an AC-tree automatonA/AC and an AC-TRSR/AC whose rewrite
rules do not contain AC-function symbols, construct AC-tree automaton
C/AC such that L(C/AC) = [→∗R/AC ](L(A/AC)).
(iv) Given an AC-tree automaton A/AC and a term t, determine whether
t ∈ L(A/AC).
(v) Given an AC-tree automaton A/AC, determine whether L(A/AC) = ∅.
The computation results obtained by the operations (i)–(iii) can be re-used
for new inputs. For automated veriﬁcation, the above function (iii) is useful
in order to construct models.
We consider the example in Fig. 2. The rewrite system R consists of the
single rewrite rule 0→ s(s(0)). The tree automaton A1 accepts a tree t if one
of the following three conditions is satisﬁed: (1) t = 0, (2) t = sum(s(0), s(0)),
or (3) t = sum(t1, t2) such that t1, t2 are accepted by A1/AC. Due to the
declaration AC: sum, the binary symbol sum is associative and commutative.
Thus, the above language coincides with L = {t | |t|s(0) is even }. This means
t consists of the three components sum, 0, s(0) and the number of occurrences
of s(0) in t is even.
We take L(A1/AC) (= L) as an initial state space, then the transition
system induced by R/AC satisﬁes that: s is an element in [→∗R/AC ](L ) if and
only if s = sum{s1, . . . , sn } such that
∑n
i=1[[si]] is even, where [[0]] = 0 and
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[[s(t)]] = [[t]]+1. Namely, s is a term generated by R/AC with A1/AC whenever
the sum of natural numbers occurring in s is even. On the other hand, the
tree language [→∗R/AC ](L ) can be represented by an AC-tree automaton, for
instance, A2/AC deﬁned in Fig. 2. But the advantage of using ACTAS is that
we can construct an AC-tree automaton as a result of descendant computation.
One can observe that in constructing AC-tree automata by the ﬁxpoint
computation, the bounded computation is often required, because given an
AC-TRS R/AC and an AC-tree automaton A/AC, (a) [→∗R/AC ](L(A/AC)) is
not computable in general, and (b) even if [→∗R/AC ](L(A/AC)) is computable
under a certain condition, it may not be recognizable with AC-tree automata.
These two cases correspond to non-terminating computation.
From the above observation, in ACTAS, three parameters are arranged in
the control panel. (See the lower left-hand corner in Fig. 1). Parameter 1
restricts the number of the execution of the outermost-loop in the algorithm:
By setting Parameter 1 to be n ( 1) in function (iii), we can execute the
rewrite descendant computation only of n-loops. In case that Parameter 1 is
0, the program checks whether a given ACTAS code is syntactically correct as
no substantial computation occurs.
For computing over- or under-approximated results, we select appropriate
positive integers for Parameters 2 and 3. If non-left-linear rewrite rules like
f(x, x) → x are included in the rewrite system, we need to check, in the
algorithm of function (iii), whether tree automata Ap1 = (F ,Q, {p1},∆) and
Ap2 = (F ,Q, {p2},∆) satisfy
L(Ap1/AC) ∩ L(Ap2/AC) = ∅
for some p1, p2 in Q with p1 = p2. The values of Parameters 2 and 3 restrict
the search depth and width of the decision procedure of the above question.
But if Parameters 2 and 3 are the maximum 100, upper-bound limitation is
ignored. That in turn results in the exact solution if the computation termi-
nates. Hence, by selecting appropriate positive integers for Parameters 1–3,
one can obtain under-approximated results of [→∗R/AC ](L(A/AC)) in reason-
able time. On the other hand, by letting Parameters 2 and 3 be 0, it turns
out over-approximated results.
3 Cryptographic Protocol Veriﬁcation
We explain below how to verify network protocols by using ACTAS. In the
protocol illustrated in Fig. 3, we write E(x, y) for a message y encrypted by
some key x, and K(x) for a principal x’s secret key. The goal of this protocol
is to send a secret message m from alice to bob without losing the secrecy.
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Hence m is encrypted with another secret key (nonce) r, and thus r is also
encrypted and transfered to bob. In this network communication, alice ﬁrst
sends a triple of E(K(alice), r), alice the sender’s ID, and bob the receiver’s
ID. Then server reacts to this request by sending back E(K(bob), r) to alice.
At the ﬁnal step alice sends the pair of E(K(bob), r) and E(r,m), to bob. The
latter component is generated by encrypting m by r. The receiver bob can








Fig. 3. A cryptographic protocol
Now we assume that an intruder eve has the following 4 abilities:
1. If eve knows x and E(x, y), then eve also knows y,
2. eve knows how to apply encryption and decryption functions E and D,
i.e. if eve knows x and y, eve can construct E(x, y) and D(x, y),
3. eve knows its own secret key K(eve) and names of all the other principals,
e.g. alice and bob,
4. eve can wiretap the network channels, i.e. eve knows all information ﬂow-
ing in the network of Fig. 3.
To detect the security ﬂaw (otherwise, to ensure the secrecy of the proto-
col), we verify the protocol by using TRS and tree automata. We ﬁrst model
by a tree automaton the initial knowledge of the intruder eve. We then gen-
erate the set of states reachable from the initial knowledge by the following
TRS:
Rcrypt = {D(x,E(x, y))→ y }
The TRS Rcrypt corresponds to the above intruder’s ability 1. The other
assumptions 2–4, which are the intruder’s initial knowledge and available op-
erations, can be represented by the tree automaton Ainitial, that is shown in
Fig. 4.
The tree automaton Ainitial accepts a term t if and only if t is obtainable
by the intruder without using the encryption-decryption axiom Rcrypt. The
set [→∗Rcrypt ](L(Ainitial)) of reachable states corresponds to the ﬁxpoint of the
intruder’s knowledge. By computing rewrite descendants (function (iii)), we
have a tree automaton Aﬁxpoint that satisﬁes L(Aﬁxpoint) = [→∗Rcrypt ](L(Ainitial))
if there exists. Therefore, by solving membership constraint (function (iv))






6: d(x,e(x,y)) -> y
7:
8: [T-rule(q): A_initial]
9: d(q,q) -> q
10: e(q,q) -> q
11:
12: alice -> q
13: bob -> q
14: eve -> q
15: k(q_e) -> q
16: eve -> q_e
17:
18: e(q_ka,q_r) -> q
19: k(q_a) -> q_ka
20: alice -> q_a
21:
22: e(q_kb,q_r) -> q
23: k(q_b) -> q_kb
24: bob -> q_b
25:
26: e(q_r,q_m) -> q
27: m -> q_m
28: r -> q_r






6: d(x,e(x,y)) -> y
7: s(x,y,z) -> e(k(z),d(k(y),x))
8: s(x,y,z) -> x
9: s(x,y,z) -> y
10: s(x,y,z) -> z
11:
12: [T-rule(q): A_initial2]
13: d(q,q) -> q
14: e(q,q) -> q
15: s(q,q,q) -> q
16:
17: alice -> q
18: bob -> q
19: eve -> q
20: k(q_e) -> q
21: eve -> q_e
22:
23: s(q_kar,q_a,q_b) -> q
24: e(q_ka,q_r) -> q_kar
25: k(q_a) -> q_ka
26: alice -> q_a
27:
28: e(q_kb,q_r) -> q
29: k(q_b) -> q_kb
30: bob -> q_b
31:
32: e(q_r,q_m) -> q
33: m -> q_m
34: r -> q_r
Fig. 5. Speciﬁcation code of cryptographic protocol assuming active attack
m ∈ L(Aﬁxpoint)?, it can be determined whether or not the protocol is secure
against wiretapping.
Along the similar construction scheme, we can detect that the same proto-
col is not secure against impersonation. The associated tree automaton and
TRS is illustrated in Fig. 5, that represents the previous protocol example in
which intruder’s active attack is assumed. By allowing that every principal
(including the intruder eve) sends a request to server, we add the rewrite rule
s(x, y, z)→ E(k(z), D(k(y), x))
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loop (T-rule) (state) time (sec)
0 18 9 —
1 30 16 3
2 41 16 12
3 44 16 22
4 44 16 32
Fig. 6. The numbers of transition rules and state symbols (loop 0–4)
and the transition rule s(q, q, q) → q to the previous code. In the left-hand
side s(x, y, z) of the rewrite rule, the variables x, y, z are respectively (in-
tended to) assigned to encrypted data, sender’s ID and receiver’s ID. The
result of this rewriting step is a server’s reply, and that is hoped to be re-
ceived by a sender. More precisely, the sender receives an encrypted message
E(K(s1), D(K(s2), s3)), that is once decrypted with a sender’s key at server
site and the result is encrypted with a receiver’s key. We assume also that eve
can decompose any data of the form s(t1, t2, t3), and this situation is repre-
sented by the other three rewrite rules.
In the experiment, by using function (iii) of ACTAS with Parameter 1 to be
4 or the greater (and the others to be arbitrary positive integers), we obtain an
under-approximated result. The numbers of transition rules and state symbols
at each loop are shown in Fig. 6. This table together with the line graphs is
generated automatically. We can save the displayed data as HTML format
ﬁles (Fig. 7).
The resulting tree automaton accepts the secret message m, and thus, we
know that the protocol is not secure. Actually, the protocol allows the follow-
ing security ﬂaw: The intruder eve ﬁrst sends the tuple of E(K(alice), r), alice,
eve to server. These elements are included in eve’s initial knowledge due to the
assumptions 3 and 4. Then eve obtains E(K(eve), r) as a response from server.
By the assumptions 2 and 3, eve creates D(D(K(eve), E(K(eve), r)), E(r,m))
that gives rise to m, because of Rcrypt that is the assumption 1.
4 Diﬃe-Hellman Key-Exchange Protocol
The protocol illustrated below is called Diﬃe-Hellman key-exchange algorithm
(e.g. Section 22.1, [15]):
In the ﬁgure H(x, y) stands for the composition of data x and y, that is
an integer yx (mod p where p is given) in the real situation. To simplify the
property of H , we assume in this model that H is implemented as H(x, y) =
px+y (mod q where p, q are given). A secret key of a principal x is denoted
by K(x). The goal of this protocol is without losing the secrecy to share
a session key by exchanging some data between the initiator (alice in the
H. Ohsaki, T. Takai / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 124 (2005) 97–111106
Fig. 7. Tool support for state space analysis
alice




Fig. 8. Diﬃe-Hellman key-exchange algorithm
example) and the receiver (bob), and then to send from the initiator to receiver
a message encrypted by the session key. The protocol consists of the three
steps: alice ﬁrst chooses a number r and sends it to bob together with an
integer H(K(alice), r). We suppose that no one else can retrieve K(alice) only
from H(K(alice), r). At the second step bob returns H(K(bob), r) to alice.
Because of the exponentiation in the implementation of H , one can assume
that H is associative and commutative:
H(x,H(y, z)) = H(H(x, y), z) H(x, y) = H(y, x)







7: d(x,e(x,y)) -> y
8:
9: [T-rule(q): Assumption]
10: d(q,q) -> q
11: e(q,q) -> q
12: h(q,q) -> q
13:
14: alice -> q
15: bob -> q
16: eve -> q
17:
18: k(q_e) -> q
19: eve -> q_e
20: h(q_ka,q_r) -> q
21: k(q_a) -> q_ka
22: alice -> q_a
23: r -> q_r
24:
25: r -> q
26:
27: h(q_kb,q_r) -> q
28: k(q_b) -> q_kb
29: bob -> q_b
30:
31: e(q_kabr,q_m) -> q
32: h(q_kbr,q_ka) -> q_kabr
33: h(q_kb,q_r) -> q_kbr
34: m -> q_m
Fig. 9. Diﬃe-Hellman key-exchange protocol (assuming wiretapping only)
Due to the ﬁrst two steps, alice can generate H(H(K(bob), r), K(alice)) by
combining H(K(bob), r) and K(alice). The latter component is her secret key.
Similarly, bob also generates H(H(K(alice), r), K(bob)) such that:
H(H(K(alice), r), K(bob)) =AC H(H(K(bob), r), K(alice)).
Hence bob obtain the message m as follows.
D(H(H(K(alice), r),K(bob)), E(H(H(K(bob), r),K(alice)),m)) =AC
D(H(H(K(bob), r),K(alice)), E(H(H(K(bob), r),K(alice)),m)) →Rcrypt m
The assumption of the protocol can be speciﬁed as the ACTAS code like
in Fig. 9. In this setting we suppose that (a) the intruder eve can wiretap
the network channels, but (b) eve does not actively attack to the protocol.
Even if the binary function symbol H is associative and commutative, the
AC-rewrite descendants can be computed by using the same algorithm of
[16], because H does not appear in rewrite rules. But since the left-hand
side of Rcrypt has multiple occurrences of the variable x, the intersection-
emptiness problem for AC-tree automata has to be dealt with in the algorithm.
The intersection of AC-tree automata can be computed in ACTAS eﬃciently.
However, the resulting AC-tree automata are no longer AC-regular in this
eﬃcient construction, and to solve the emptiness problem for non-regular AC-
tree automata is EXPSPACE-hard [12].
In fact, when computing the exact solution fully automatically, it is nearly
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non-terminating computation. Then there are two choices for this example:
th over-approximation algorithm (by setting Parameter 2 to be 0) and the
under-approximation (by choosing positive integers for Parameters 2 and 3).
Over-approximation. In this case, the result, that is an AC-tree automaton,
is some superset of eve’s obtainable knowledge. Namely, if the secret message
m is not accepted, the secrecy of the protocol is guaranteed. By taking the
above input (Fig. 9), we obtain an AC-tree automaton as the output that
accepts m. But then, it does not imply security ﬂaw of the protocol. At
the current implementation there is no option to reﬁne the over-approximated
result.
Under-approximation. In the full automation mode, the security ﬂaw of
the protocol is not detected either. This meas that by taking several pairs
of positive integers for Parameters 2 and 3, the under-approximated result is
obtained, but none of the AC-tree automata that represents some subset of
eve’s obtainable knowledge accepts the secret message m. Despite of this fact,
we have another possibility to handle this protocol example in the AC-tree
automata framework. The underlying idea of computing rewrite descendants
is, given a tree automatonA = (F ,Q,Qﬁn ,∆), to ﬁnd a rewrite rule l → r ∈ R
and an assignment ρ = {xi → qi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} with q, qi ∈ Q and 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that lρ →∗A/AC q but rρ →∗A/AC q. Then we add new states and transition
rules to A, so that the newly obtained system A′/AC satisﬁes rρ →∗A′/AC q.
This process corresponds to one-step rewrite descendant computation for the
case that t →R t′ for some t ∈ L(A/AC) and t′ /∈ L(A/AC) such that t/o = lσ,
t′ = s[rσ]o, ρ = σ ↓A/AC (i.e. ρ is a normalized substitution of σ with respect
to A/AC). Furthermore, as an exceptional case in the above computation,
non-left-linear rewrite rules are treated as follows. For instance, we consider
the rule f(x, x) → x and take two (diﬀerent) state symbols p1 and p2, then
we check whether
L(A(p1)/AC) ∩ L(A(p2)/AC) = ∅.
The above L(A(pi)/AC) is a tree language accepted by A/AC whose ﬁnal state
Qﬁn is replaced by {pi}. If the above question is positively solved, we take the
diﬀerent assignment x → p1 and x → p2 for the same variable x. Formally,
non-linear variable x is replaced by x1 and x2, and then deﬁne the substitution
ρ containing the assignments x1 → p1 and x2 → p2.
Suppose A0/AC is the AC-tree automaton initially provided. Then the
following statement is stated.
Lemma 4.1 For each state symbols p and q of A0/AC, the intersection-
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emptiness of L(A0(p)/AC) and L(A0(q)/AC) is tested by solving ﬁnitely many
membership problems.
Proof. We suppose p = q, where q is the ﬁnal state symbol of the AC-
tree automaton in Fig. 9. By construction, L(A0(p)/AC) accepts only ﬁnitely
many trees t1, . . . , tn, and t1, . . . , tn are eﬀectively generated, due to Ko¨nig’s
Lemma e.g. in [10]. So, in this case, the intersection-emptiness is solvable by
membership tests. The remaining case is obvious. 
Membership function in the system assists us to perform the above test.
In theory, membership problem for regular AC-tree automata is NP-complete
(Corollary 4, [12]), but in this example, the size of trees is at most 9. This
implies that all the possible combinations of p and q are computable in rea-
sonable time. By using this result, we can examine the following property is
correct.
Lemma 4.2 Let p1, p2, p3, p4 be state symbols of A0/AC such that
L(A0(p1)/AC) ∩ L(A0(p2)/AC) = ∅,
then D(p1, E(p2, p3)) →∗A0/AC p4 if and only if p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = q. 
Theorem 4.3 The tree language [→∗Rcrypt/AC](L(A0/AC)) is recognizable with
A0/AC. 
Therefore A0/AC is already the ﬁxpoint, namely, the protocol is secure
against wiretapping, because m is not in eve’s initial knowledge L(A0/AC).
Regarding the active attack by assuming impersonation, the security ﬂaw









Fig. 10. Man-in-the-middle attack in Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange protocol
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